United Nations A/61/796–S/2007/145

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
14 March 2007

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-first session
Agenda item 27
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Sixty-second year

Identical letters dated 12 March 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia dated 12 March 2007 regarding the shelling of villages in Upper Abkhazia, Georgia, on 11 March 2007 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 27, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Irakli **Alasania**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

07-27028 (E) 160307

Annex to the identical letters dated 12 March 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia

12 March 2007

On 11 March 2007, at about 22.10, villages of Upper Abkhazia came under fire by military helicopters that, as preliminary information indicates, crossed Georgia's state border with the Russian Federation from the north.

The shelling caused damage to the office of the Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, a school and police buildings stationed in the village of Chkhalta, as well as the local infrastructure, especially in the villages of Azhara, Kvabchara and Ptishi. No casualties were reported.

Within one hour of the incident, the Georgian side notified immediately and demanded explanations from the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to Georgia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in Moscow. The Office of the State Minister of Georgia for Conflict Resolution contacted the Abkhazian side for appropriate explanations. Information was transmitted to the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia and the partner countries.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia condemns this act as aiming at hindering the stabilization and reconstruction processes having developed actively in Upper Abkhazia in the recent period and at escalating tension in the region, as well as being directed against peaceful resolution of the conflict.

The Georgian side expects immediate action to be taken by the United Nations Observer Mission and insists that the incident be thoroughly investigated and appropriate conclusions provided in the shortest possible period.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia expects the Russian side to give its own explanations concerning the incident.

United Nations A/61/797

General Assembly

Distr.: General
14 March 2007

Original: English

Sixty-first session
Agenda item 80
The rule of law at the national and international levels

Letter dated 9 March 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In my capacity as Chair of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, I have the honour to enclose herewith the Declaration by the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, adopted on 29 January 2007, regarding the case of the Libyan children affected by HIV virus (see annex).

Furthermore, I kindly request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 80.

(*Signed*) Rodrigo **Malmierca Diaz**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations
Chair of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement

07-27034 (E) 160307

Annex to the letter dated 9 March 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Declaration by the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement on the case of the Libyan children affected by HIV virus

29 January 2007

The Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement in New York has taken note of the statement delivered by the delegation of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya concerning the legal, judicial and humanitarian dimensions of the court ruling pronounced in the case of the Libyan children affected by HIV virus.

The Coordinating Bureau reaffirms that the Movement will remain guided in its endeavours by the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the founding principles of the Movement. To this end, the Movement stressed the principles of sovereignty, sovereign equality of States, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of States.

The Coordinating Bureau stresses the respect for political independence of all States and equal rights of all peoples without distinction and calls for international cooperation in solving problems and the fulfilment in good faith of the obligations assumed in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

The Coordinating Bureau also notes that according to the statement delivered by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the ruling pronounced in this case has not yet exhausted all levels of appeal, and calls for upholding the rule of law, due process and the respect for judicial independence and the national jurisdiction of States.

The Coordinating Bureau further expresses its sympathy with the Libyan victims, the children and their families for their pain and suffering.

United Nations A/61/798–S/2007/149

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
15 March 2007

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-first session
Agenda item 27
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Sixty-second year

Letter dated 12 March 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In my capacity as a representative of the country coordinator of GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova), I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement by GUAM on the so-called elections held in Abkhazia, Georgia, on 11 February and 4 March 2007 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 27, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Viktor **Kryzhanivskyi**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

07-27112 (E) 160307

Annex to the letter dated 12 March 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by GUAM on the so-called elections held in Abkhazia, Georgia, on 11 February and 4 March 2007

The GUAM member States once again express their deep concern over the so-called local and parliamentary elections held by the separatist regime of Abkhazia, Georgia, on 11 February and 4 March 2007.

It is noteworthy that these spurious elections were accompanied by the repressive acts of the Sokhumi separatist regime, such as threatening the local population, forcing them to participate in the illegal voting, opening fire at a group of Georgian and Abkhaz young persons peacefully protesting against so-called elections, kidnapping and unlawfully arresting three protesters.

We stress once again that elections in any region of Georgia should be carried out in accordance with the legislation of Georgia and with the direct participation of the entire population of the respective region. It is well known that the overwhelming majority of the peaceful population of the region of various ethnic origins was subject to mass expulsion from the places of their permanent residence. Thus, it is obvious that any kind of so-called elections carried out under such conditions are devoid of any legitimate basis and its results shall be considered a priori invalid by the whole international community, as has been done in the recent statements of the European Union and the United States.

Any kind of reference to the legitimacy of these spurious elections is immoral and cynical as an attempt to neglect the right of refugees and to legitimize results of ethnic cleansing.

The GUAM member States insistently urge the separatist regime to engage constructively in a direct dialogue with the Georgian Government and cease all unlawful activities against the peace process.

United Nations A/61/798–S/2007/149*

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
26 March 2007

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-first session
Agenda item 27
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Sixty-second year

Letter dated 9 March 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In my capacity as a representative of the country coordinator of GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova), I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement by GUAM on the so-called elections held in Abkhazia, Georgia, on 11 February and 4 March 2007 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 27, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Viktor **Kryzhanivskyi**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* Reissued for technical reasons.

07-27112* (E) 260307

Annex to the letter dated 9 March 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by GUAM on the so-called elections held in Abkhazia, Georgia, on 11 February and 4 March 2007

The GUAM member States once again express their deep concern over the so-called local and parliamentary elections held by the separatist regime of Abkhazia, Georgia, on 11 February and 4 March 2007.

It is noteworthy that these spurious elections were accompanied by the repressive acts of the Sokhumi separatist regime, such as threatening the local population, forcing them to participate in the illegal voting, opening fire at a group of Georgian and Abkhaz young persons peacefully protesting against so-called elections, kidnapping and unlawfully arresting three protesters.

We stress once again that elections in any region of Georgia should be carried out in accordance with the legislation of Georgia and with the direct participation of the entire population of the respective region. It is well known that the overwhelming majority of the peaceful population of the region of various ethnic origins was subject to mass expulsion from the places of their permanent residence. Thus, it is obvious that any kind of so-called elections carried out under such conditions are devoid of any legitimate basis and its results shall be considered a priori invalid by the whole international community, as has been done in the recent statements of the European Union and the United States.

Any kind of reference to the legitimacy of these spurious elections is immoral and cynical as an attempt to neglect the right of refugees and to legitimize results of ethnic cleansing.

The GUAM member States insistently urge the separatist regime to engage constructively in a direct dialogue with the Georgian Government and cease all unlawful activities against the peace process.

United Nations A/61/799–S/2007/152

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
15 March 2007

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-first session
Agenda item 16
The situation in Afghanistan

Security Council
Sixty-second year

The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 61/18 of 28 November 2006, and to Security Council resolution 1662 (2006), in which the Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) until 23 March 2007. The present report reviews the activities of UNAMA since my last report, dated 11 September 2006 (A/61/326-S/2006/727). During the reporting period, the Security Council received oral briefings on 9 October 2006 and 5 February 2007.

II. Current security situation

2. Insurgency-related violence peaked in September 2006 and receded thereafter due to intense security efforts and the onset of winter. The incident levels during the winter months nevertheless stood well in excess of those recorded for previous years. The figures for January 2007, for example, were more than double those in January 2006. The insurgency-related violence resulted in 2,732 fatalities between 1 September 2006 and 25 February 2007. Since the last reporting period, there was a marked increase in insurgent forces prepared to engage in conventional combat operations against Government and international security forces, and a significant improvement in the insurgents' tactics and training.

3. Despite high losses of personnel during the past year, indications pointed to an insurgency emboldened by their strategic successes, rather than disheartened by tactical failures. They continue to mount widespread roadblocks on the ring road connecting Kabul to Kandahar and Herat and to target senior public officials and community leaders. The head of the Kandahar Department of Women's Affairs and

07-26266 (E) 150307

the Governor of Paktya province were assassinated in September and October 2006, respectively. In the central and south-east regions, military operations conducted by Government and international military forces managed to clear areas only temporarily. The insurgents' leadership structure remained intact, despite the capture or killing of a few senior commanders.

4. The peace agreement concluded on 5 September 2006 between Pakistan and the local Taliban of North Waziristan did not prevent the use of the tribal area as a staging ground for attacks on Afghanistan, which had been one of the agreement's central stipulations. Security incidents involving insurgents instead rose by 50 per cent in Khost and 70 per cent in Paktika, between September and November 2006, and were accompanied by intensified propaganda activities in the form of night letters, targeted kidnappings, and preaching by itinerant mullahs. There were reports of cross-border movement in both directions.

5. Popular alienation remains a key factor behind the revitalized insurgency, and stems from inappropriate Government appointments, tribal nepotism and monopolization of power, and the marginalization of those outside the dominant social and political groups. The central Government's frequent tolerance of weak governance has diminished public confidence in its responsiveness and its readiness to hold officials accountable for their transgressions. In those cases where the centre has appointed capable governors, such as in Paktya, Uruzgan and Zabul, it has failed to provide them with the resources necessary to maintain the goodwill that they have generated.

6. Local communities have begun to enter into accords with the Government and the insurgents in order to limit the damage of warfare. Such agreements were concluded in the Zadran-populated districts in Paktya and Khost provinces, and in the Narhai district in Kunar province, where tribal elders from both sides of the border with Pakistan negotiated a non-aggression pact. An agreement of September 2006 with local elders from Musa Qala district, Helmand province, stipulating that the district would not be used as a staging ground for insurgent attacks in exchange for the withdrawal of international military forces from a radius of five kilometres from the district centre, led to five months of relative stability. However, on 2 February 2007, the Taliban successfully seized Musa Qala. At the time of writing of the present report, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was allowing provincial governor Asadullah Wafa and tribal elders the opportunity to negotiate a withdrawal of the Taliban.

7. A record number of suicide attacks occurred during the reporting period; 77 were recorded, up from 53 over the previous six months. From a peak of 21 attacks in September 2006, the frequency of suicide bombing dropped to an average of 15 incidents per month by the end of the year. Nevertheless, the 12 attacks in January 2007 remained three times higher than the figure for January 2006. The bulk of attacks were directed against foreign military convoys, but civilians were increasingly targeted. Suicide bombings represent the most visible link between the insurgency and international terrorism. Many attacks appear to have been financed from abroad. According to national and international security sources, the training camps for these attacks are located outside Afghanistan. The Al-Qaida affiliated trainers in these facilities reportedly include Chechens and Uzbeks, as well as Yemenis and other Arab nationals. Four of the 12 identified suicide bombers in January 2007 were not Afghans.

8. The Strengthening Peace Programme, led by former President Mujaddidi, has had some success in reaching out to Taliban foot soldiers, who are mostly disaffected Afghans manipulated by their leadership. The programme had resulted in 2,761 declarations of allegiance to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan as of late January 2007. Most, however, were not significant actors and their pledges had a negligible impact on the insurgency. Reconciliation efforts were arguably hindered by the presence of outdated information on the list established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1267 (1999). Several persons on the list have reconciled to the Afghan Government since late 2001. Others are reported to have died. Meanwhile, a significant evolution of the Taliban leadership has taken place at both the central and provincial levels. The November 2006 Security Council mission to Afghanistan was briefed on the list. Subsequently, in its report on the mission (S/2006/935), the Security Council recommended that the list be updated as necessary and on the basis of the most up-to-date information, as envisaged by the relevant Security Council resolutions. It is worth noting that in its resolution 1735 (2006), the Council, inter alia, foresees the possibility of de-listing.

9. Formed in the wake of a joint security assessment prepared last summer (see A/61/326-S/2006/72), the Policy Action Group met on a bimonthly basis throughout the reporting period. The Group brought together senior Afghan security officials, their international counterparts and representatives of Member States with a significant troop presence in Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan and Zabul. Convened by President Karzai and led by his national Security Adviser, the Group coordinated a strategic and timely response to the challenges posed by the insurgency in these provinces. In the past six months, the Group has begun to deliver a real comprehensive analysis and, increasingly, action, such as the decision to establish an auxiliary police force in insecure provinces (see sect. IV below). On the recommendation of the Group, $18.5 million was committed by the Ministry of Finance and $1.5 million by the Ministry of Education for development projects in areas most directly affected by the insurgency. In an attempt to reach out directly to disaffected communities, President Karzai chaired a Group meeting in Kandahar in December 2006.

10. In the northern part of Afghanistan, factional violence and criminality continue to pose a significant challenge to the authority of the Government and present a danger to the international assistance community. Disputes between former factional commanders led to some violent incidents in Badakhshan, Faryab and Jawzjan provinces. Competition over control of revenue sources, including drug trade routes, is suspected to be the main reason for the clashes observed.

III. Political developments

A. National Assembly

11. Parliament's strengths and weaknesses were displayed during the reporting period. The National Assembly developed into a vibrant forum for debate on a range of issues and provided an increasingly powerful counterweight to the executive branch, while new leaders emerged and substantial political regroupings took place. Three multi-ethnic opposition blocs, including jihadis, leftists, independents and women, were formed: the National Independence, the National Observer, and the

Progressive parliamentary groups. Opposition blocs increasingly appear to be drafting common platforms. In November, parliamentarians and party leaders announced the formation of the National United Council, an alliance centred around prominent jihadis, leftists and ethno-nationalists. The Council platform includes support for decentralization and federalism, regularizing the presence of international military forces and resolving border disputes. Meanwhile, National Independence leaders have launched consultations on a platform that would enable them to transform their parliamentary group into a party.

12. These developments appear to reflect dissatisfaction with the single non-transferable vote system employed in the 2005 elections, which resulted in a fragmented Parliament where individual leaders are dominant. The Independent Electoral Commission has drafted an amended electoral law that envisages a modified mixed proportional representation system. The draft law will be reviewed by the Ministry of Justice Legislative Department and then submitted to the National Assembly for endorsement in the coming months. Although the transition of the Independent Electoral Commission itself into a State-funded budgetary entity was completed during the reporting period, an approximate deficit of $11.5 million remains unfunded and could jeopardize the future electoral planning.

13. Both houses of Parliament have been actively reviewing and amending the following pieces of legislation: the Provincial Council Law, the Prison Law, the Juvenile Justice Code, the Counter-Narcotics Law, the Environmental Law, the Law on the Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution, the Kabul City Master Plan, and the Law on the Structure of Government. A lack of adequate legal expertise still hampers the quality of parliamentary action taken.

14. On 31 January, a commission of the lower house of Parliament circulated a resolution on national reconciliation, which highlighted the need for reconciliation and, among other issues, declared that all political parties and belligerent groups associated with the two and a half decades of conflict should be immune from prosecution. The resolution, which passed the lower house with a majority vote, was approved by the upper house on 20 February 2007. President Karzai stated that he would not approve any bill that was unconstitutional or against sharia law, and affirmed that only victims of human rights violations have the right to forgive.

B. Provincial government

15. Recent appointments of qualified officials in some provinces have led to notable improvements in security, administrative services and dialogue between the local population and provincial authorities. However, former commander networks continue to exert influence at the provincial and district levels, and often retain access to illegal revenue streams, despite the removal of many of their leaders from administrative and security posts in their provinces of origin. Governors in many provinces are locally weak and under-resourced, while a lack of clarity in the role of provincial councils has contributed to tensions between governors and elected representatives. Corruption within the administrative sector remains a major concern, and influences many of the provincial and district level appointments.

16. The functioning of provincial councils varied between individual provinces. Common concerns include limited consultation with them on the part of governors and lack of response from provincial administrations to information requests, as

well as inadequate logistical and budgetary support. Nevertheless, some progress was made in certain provinces, including Herat and in most of the north, as governors increasingly discussed development, administrative and political issues with provincial council members.

17. Provincial development committees are developing costed and prioritized provincial development plans in 25 out of 34 provinces. However, budget processes and sectoral strategies at the level of the central government do not account for provincial development committees. As a first step towards reconciling provincially determined priorities with budgetary resources, the Government is piloting budgetary reforms to ensure an equitable allocation of resources across provinces in the Ministries of Education, Health and Rural Rehabilitation, and Development and in Balkh, Kandahar and Panjshir provinces.

C. Regional developments

18. Trade between Afghanistan and key economic partners in the region — Pakistan, China and the Islamic Republic of Iran — grew, exceeding $2.5 billion in 2006. The Government of Afghanistan, with India's support, held the Second Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan in New Delhi on 18 and 19 November 2006 to stimulate regional cooperation on trade facilitation and transport; investment trade; electricity trade and energy development; and agriculture. Through the consultative groups established in the framework of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board/Afghanistan National Development Strategy processes, UNAMA assisted in the preparation of the conference. In December 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Afghanistan signed a memorandum of understanding on economic cooperation at the second Iran-Afghanistan Joint Economic Commission meeting in Kabul. Agreements on electricity transit were reached between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Tajikistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Kyrgyzstan.

19. Neighbouring countries contributed extensive financial and technical assistance to Afghanistan's infrastructure. Hundreds of kilometres of roads were built and/or rehabilitated, irrigation and water supply systems were reconstructed, three hospitals and 10 schools were built and a number of higher education institutions received research laboratories, textbooks, computers and other equipment. In an encouraging sign of technical cooperation, the Afghan and Pakistani Ministers of Health launched a cross-border polio vaccination campaign, supported by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNAMA in December 2006.

20. However, relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan remained tense. Commitments early in the reporting period to cooperate in resolving cross-border issues have yet to realize their full potential. In summit talks between President Karzai and President Musharraf in Kabul and New York in September 2006, both the insurgency and counter-terrorism efforts were prioritized. This sentiment was reaffirmed in quarterly meetings held by the countries' Ministers for Foreign Affairs. A proposal to hold peace jirgas (gatherings of tribal and community leaders) was agreed upon during a September 2006 meeting in Washington, D.C. of the Presidents of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States of America. During its November 2006 mission to Afghanistan, the Security Council was briefed on these

plans. Regional peace jirga commissions were subsequently established by both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Despite these efforts, progress on substance and logistics remained slow, and no date has been set for these events.

21. Over the course of the reporting period, my Special Representative held talks with high-ranking officials in Pakistan, with a view to encouraging further dialogue between the two countries on issues including the current status of the insurgency and its cross-border dimension. It seemed that there would be scope for increased engagement on a number of practical issues similar to the cross-border polio campaign.

22. The Afghanistan-Pakistan military Tripartite Commission, chaired by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/ISAF, held its twentieth plenary session in Pakistan on 12 January 2007. It focused on improving tactical coordination. In addition to the subcommittees for border security, military intelligence-sharing and counter-improvised explosive devices, the Tripartite Commission developed terms of reference for the new Operational Coordination Working Group and conducted preliminary joint planning for offensive pre-emptive operations in spring 2007.

IV. Security institutions

A. Disbandment of illegal armed groups

23. Over the course of the reporting period, only limited progress was made with respect to the disbandment of illegal armed groups. The rate of weapons handovers was not encouraging, despite the launch of the main phase of the disbandment operations in five provinces between 1 May and 7 June 2006. From September 2006 to 25 February 2007, only 4,496 light and heavy weapons were submitted. By the end of 2006, illegal armed groups in just three districts of the five target provinces were deemed by the disbandment programme Joint Secretariat to have complied with the programme objectives: Farkhar district (Takhar province); and Kohistan 1 and Mahmud Raqi districts (Kapisa province). Compliance certification for these districts permitted the release of development funds earmarked for the disbandment programme. The pace of weapons submission and overall disbandment compliance, particularly in the north, was thought to have suffered from the overall deterioration in the security situation and diminished confidence in the country's stability.

24. In response to stalled implementation, stakeholders in the disbandment process conducted a joint review of the disbandment programme. In September 2006, Vice-President Khalili commissioned the formation of a joint review panel of the programme. The review panel identified the need to renew Government commitment to the programme, to focus on illegal armed groups actively engaged in criminal activity, and for flexibility in awarding development projects to districts where illegal armed groups were positively engaged with the programme. President Karzai convened, in November 2006, meetings of ministers, international stakeholders and jihadi leaders to discuss the state of the disbandment programme and ways forward. The recommendations of the review panel were reflected in an action plan that the President endorsed on 7 February 2007. The action plan gives the National Security Adviser a ministerial coordination and reporting role and designates the Ministry of the Interior as having the eventual lead in the implementation of the disbandment programme. The Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme, the United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP) implementing arm of the disbandment programme, will accordingly undertake capacity-building with regard to the Ministry of the Interior and other concerned ministries and departments.

B. Afghan security forces

Afghan National Police

25. With the announcement of 40 senior police officer appointments through the Ministry of the Interior on 13 January 2007, the pay and rank reform of the top leadership of the Afghan National Police has been nearly completed. While the most recent appointments have been based largely on merit, the reform process continues to present difficulties. Some of those proposed for posts lack the requisite qualifications. In other cases, political considerations are the driving factor. Reports of bribes are commonplace, particularly for lucrative positions in drug-producing areas or along smuggling routes.

26. According to the Ministry of the Interior, there are 61,879 personnel assigned to the Afghan National Police. In the absence of independent verification, many observers believe there is a substantial discrepancy between those that exist on paper and those who are actually present for duty in the field. It is hoped that the establishment of an individual salary payment, which as of December 2006 was being implemented in 29 of 34 provinces, may assist in removing opportunities for corruption.

27. The Afghan National Auxiliary Police programme (see A/61/326-S/2006/727) initially commenced in six priority insurgency-affected provinces: Farah, Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan and Zabul. It was subsequently extended to the provinces of Herat, Kunar, Laghman, Logar, Nangahar, Nuristan, Paktya and Paktika. So far, 3,212 have been trained, equipped and deployed; 819 are currently in training; and 4,590 have been vetted and are awaiting training. The current plan is to train a total of 9,063 Afghan National Auxiliary Police by 1 May 2007. After a 10-day training period, Afghan National Auxiliary Police recruits are deployed to serve specifically in their areas of origin but are integrated into a unified chain of command and control under the provincial Chiefs of Police. International stakeholders in the reforms of the Ministry of the Interior, including UNAMA, monitor the implementation of the programme in the various provinces, especially the recruitment and vetting processes. The aim is to prevent infiltration by those who owe allegiance to former local militia commanders, rather than to the central government.

28. The same concerns for adequate security lay behind the recent establishment of the Afghanistan National Civil Order Police, a 5,000-strong force with the special capacity to tactically respond to incidents of civil disorder and emergency situations in the urban and rural areas of Afghanistan.

29. The Afghan National Police remain dependent on the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, administered by UNDP, for the provision of remunerations and other support. The budget continues to suffer from significant shortfalls for the police salary component, with adverse implications for the proposed Afghan National Police salary regime and the salaries and logistic support for the newly

established Afghan National Auxiliary Police and Afghanistan National Civil Order Police.

Afghan National Army

30. At the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board meeting held in Berlin in January 2007, the Ministry of Defence announced a new target strength for the Afghan National Army of 64,000 by the end of 2008. This is an increase of 4,200 on the current Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board benchmark. To achieve this figure, training has been stepped up to include 2,000 recruits every five weeks, and a set of incentives planned in 2006 are beginning to materialize. These include a pay rise (effected in October 2006); the establishment of a more sustainable operations-training-leave cycle; and a range of management and administrative initiatives.

31. Despite signs of improvements in retention and a surge in recruiting over the winter months, concerns over the actual "present for duty" strength remain. The current assigned strength of the army at headquarters, in the five regional commands, and in logistics, training and administrative structures stands at 32,200, with a further 7,500 either in training, on sick leave or between assignments. The estimated "present for duty" strength is approximately 25,000.

32. Beyond manpower and equipment shortfalls, the Afghan National Army continues to make good progress, notwithstanding the challenge of building an army while having to conduct combat operations. Logistics support, administrative systems and the fabric of the institution are improving. Most significantly, in Operation Oqab at the end of 2006, the army (and the police) planned and executed complex joint operations as equal partners with ISAF. This delivered a much-needed boost in confidence to the Ministry of Defence.

C. International Security Assistance Force

33. The reporting period witnessed the completion of the final stage of the expansion of ISAF. On 5 October, the NATO-led force assumed responsibility for international stability and security operations throughout Afghanistan, including a number of former coalition forces operating in the eastern part of the country. The total number of international forces deployed did not change significantly. As of 7 February 2007, ISAF force strength stands at some 35,460 troops, and an additional 8,000 remain deployed under United States-led coalition command.

34. The expansion was completed on the heels of the September 2006 Operation Medusa, over the course of which ISAF expelled hundreds of insurgents formerly entrenched in Kandahar's Panjwai district. Operation Oqab began in October and combined the efforts of Afghan forces and ISAF to increase freedom of movement on the Afghan Ring Road and to enhance security in areas designated as Afghan development zones. Although still short of some resources, ISAF continues to conduct operations against the Taliban, maintain momentum in areas of progress, and enable the accelerated development and governance reforms.

35. The provincial reconstruction teams remain an important element of NATO strategy. Over the course of the reporting period, two additional teams were deployed to Nuristan (United States) and Wardak (Turkey), bringing the total to 25. UNAMA has contributed to the training of incoming team leaders with courses for commanders of provincial reconstruction teams, and frequent participation in ISAF

provincial reconstruction team courses and conferences. UNAMA engagement supports ISAF's ongoing effort to achieve greater uniformity among provincial reconstruction teams and greater conformity with the emerging government-led provincial development plans.

36. ISAF assumed responsibility for co-chairing the military Tripartite Commission, and has made the development of operational cooperation between the Afghan and Pakistani armies one of its highest priorities. An additional working group was created to focus on coordination of border security operations, and an Afghan, Pakistani and ISAF joint operations intelligence cell, tasked with enabling the sharing of military intelligence, was established in Kabul.

V. Human rights and the rule of law

A. Human rights and gender

Human rights

37. Lack of security remained the greatest challenge to the enjoyment of human rights in Afghanistan. The killing of teachers and attacks on education facilities continued. Fighting in southern Afghanistan caused displacement and affected aid assistance delivery. According to ISAF, insurgency-related violence led to an estimated 134 civilian fatalities between October 2006 and January 2007.

38. Civilians were caught in crossfire during combat operations, particularly in the south. Of concern was Operation Medusa in Zherai and Panjwai districts in Kandahar, during which ISAF was alleged to have killed 23 civilians. UNAMA interviewed witnesses and issued a public report in December 2006 urging all parties to uphold international humanitarian and human rights law and to ensure the protection of civilian life. ISAF publicly stated that civilian casualties were its single biggest failure in 2006, and measures would be taken to reduce them.

39. On 16 September 2006, President Karzai issued a presidential order establishing a transparent mechanism for all senior level appointments, thus meeting an important Afghanistan Compact benchmark. On 10 December, Human Rights Day, President Karzai publicly launched the action plan for transitional justice; he also declared that 10 December would be a national remembrance day. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights publicly expressed concern at the adoption of the resolution on national reconciliation by the National Assembly (see para. 14).

40. Curbs to media freedom continued to be reported. The head of the State-owned Radio and TV Afghanistan resigned, citing pressure from the Minister of Culture and Information to modify broadcasts in favour of Government public information stories. Afghan journalists' unions raised serious concerns about political interference in the media and how the amendments proposed in the Parliament to the new Media Law restrict freedom of expression.

41. The ratio of detainees to sentenced prisoners rose, as the capacity of the courts failed to keep pace with an increasing number of arrests. In November 2006, the Office of the Attorney General estimated that approximately 71 per cent of the over 6,000 detainees across the country were awaiting trial. A joint Afghan Independent

Human Rights Commission and UNAMA arbitrary detention monitoring campaign began in October 2006 throughout Afghanistan with the cooperation of the Ministries of Justice and the Interior and the Office of the Attorney General. Initial findings indicated that in a significant proportion of cases pre-trial detention timelines had been breached, suspects had not been provided with defence counsel, and ill-treatment and torture had been used to force confessions. Access to the National Directorate of Security and Ministry of the Interior detention facilities remained problematic for the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and UNAMA. In January 2007, the Commission and UNAMA facilitated the first human rights training for National Defence Services officers.

42. The Government continues to face enormous challenges in delivering economic and social rights. Chronic food insecurity, inability to access sufficient water, lack of health care and educational facilities, particularly for girls and women, and protracted land insecurity, affect Afghans on a daily basis. Despite progress in key areas, such as improvement in maternal mortality indicators, Afghanistan still ranks among the poorest countries in the world in terms of human development.

Gender

43. Progress towards the realization of gender equality continued to be held back by discrimination, insecurity and the persistence of customary practices. Honour killings of females by family members continue to be reported. Reasons included having been raped and elopement. Preliminary findings from the UNAMA and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission arbitrary detention monitoring campaign indicate that a high proportion of women in prison are detained for transgressing social mores. In Afghanistan's largest prison in Kabul, almost 30 per cent of female detainees are in prison for acts that do not constitute criminal offences, while a further 30 per cent are detained for adultery in breach of national due process standards.

44. Parliamentary deliberations on the abolishment of a number of ministries still pose a threat to the existence of the Ministry of Women Affairs. Staff of the provincial departments of women's affairs continue to face security threats, particularly in the south, south-east and the east. Following the assassination of the head of the Department of Women's Affairs in Kandahar, and after receiving threats, a number of women's affairs departments halted or limited their activities.

45. No significant progress was made with respect to the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, despite an expert mission to Afghanistan of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in the second half of 2006.

46. There have, however, been some positive developments. As a result of concerted lobbying efforts by national stakeholders and the international community, the drafting of the law related to family violence is on the Government's 2007 legislative agenda. A gender equity policy to improve women's representation in the civil service was drafted in 2006. Finally, the release of the National Action Plan for Women in Afghanistan, expected in 2007, will facilitate the implementation of relevant strategies in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and in turn support relevant ministries in mainstreaming gender into their respective implementation plans for the Strategy.

B. Rule of law

47. Widespread corruption in the justice system remained a serious concern. The appointment of a reform-oriented Supreme Court Chief Justice and Attorney General in 2006 was a promising development. While visible results, in terms of establishing functional and honest judicial institutions, are needed to gain the trust of the public, due process principles are to be respected when seeking to remove corrupt or unqualified personnel.

48. However, the capacity of the Ministry of Justice remains limited, particularly its legislative drafting unit, which is overburdened by the number and complexity of legislation awaiting drafting, scrutiny and review. This legislation includes the criminal procedure code, which was written to suit an immediate post-conflict environment and is in need of reform.

49. With respect to the management of correction facilities, the urgent lack of accommodation for over 1,000 detainees in 11 provincial prisons, as identified in November 2006 by the Ministry of Justice, has yet to be fully addressed. In January 2007, the Central Prisons Department announced that it had completed the past fiscal year with a large deficit and most staff in the provinces had not been paid salaries for four months. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime completed new justice complexes in Balkh, Gardez and Paktya. Other justice facilities, including family and juvenile courts, are being built in Jalalabad, Kunduz and Laghman.

50. National and international NGOs expanded the provision of legal aid, including in the provinces, and UNAMA field officers reported that that has had a positive impact in terms of the application of constitutional and legal principles. The United Nations Development Fund for Women expanded its paralegal programme and continued to support referral centres for women.

51. Given a donor tendency to establish programmes outside the framework of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, thereby curtailing coordination, UNAMA and United Nations agencies have advocated for enhanced strategic coordination in justice sector reform and to work towards increased national ownership through the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. In December 2006, in Dubai, the Afghanistan rule of law coordination meeting generated renewed international commitment to reform Afghanistan's justice sector. Consensus is emerging in favour of a multi-donor funding mechanism or a justice trust fund, possibly within the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund administered by the World Bank. The international community is supporting justice institutions to finalize a detailed sectoral reform strategy to achieve the benchmarks of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy.

VI. Economic and social development

A. Humanitarian situation

52. Afghanistan is still in the grip of drought. An extension of the joint drought appeal launched in October 2006 called for additional assistance, and brought the appeal of the Government, and the United Nations and its partners to $119 million. It covers the provinces of Helmand, Khost, Kunar, Paktika and Parwan, World Food Programme activities until April 2007, and relief for conflict-affected persons in the south. The security situation and the onset of winter affected outreach and impacted negatively on the overall capacity to implement programmes. Thus far the appeal has been funded to the level of 53 per cent. The majority of funds are allocated for emergency food relief, water provision and health services. Following a United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination team mission in July 2006, aimed at supporting national capacity to identify critical challenges in disaster management, the functions of the Department of Disaster Planning have been adjusted to strengthen its coordination and assessment capacity, including at the provincial level.

53. Several immunization programmes were conducted by the Ministry of Public Health with support from UNICEF and WHO. In September 2006 a polio national immunization campaign took place that targeted 7.2 million children under five years of age. In November 2006 another national polio eradication campaign targeted 6,955,844 children under the age of five. Five polio cases have been identified in Uruzgan, in the southern region, bringing the total number of cases in 2006 to 31, all of which have occurred in provinces where the programme is facing outreach difficulties owing to security concerns.

54. The displacement of 15,000 families in the south has been a major cause for humanitarian concern, and United Nations agencies and NGOs have been called upon to provide assistance under difficult circumstances. The collateral damage caused by combat operations to the civilian population has intensified the focus of humanitarian agencies on the protection of civilians. UNAMA, with support from the Government of Norway, will increase its humanitarian coordination capacity, including on civil military coordination and with NGOs, through the deployment of additional staff at the provincial level.

55. A total number of 139,804 Afghan refugees returned during 2006, a marked decrease compared to previous years. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is prepared to assist a total of 250,000 Afghan returnees in 2007. In a countrywide exercise concluded in February 2006, the Government of Pakistan, in cooperation with UNHCR, registered 2.16 million Afghans in Pakistan. They were issued a "proof of registration" card. The Government of Pakistan reconfirmed its decision to close four refugee camps in the North-West Frontier Province and in Balochistan. The operation is scheduled to start by 15 April and to be completed by 31 August 2007. The residents will be offered the option of returning to Afghanistan or relocating to other camps in Pakistan.

56. Mindful of the recommendations of the Security Council in its report on the mission to Afghanistan in November 2006 (S/2006/935), the Acting Emergency Relief Coordinator visited Afghanistan from 17 to 21 February 2007 to assess the overall humanitarian situation and the humanitarian coordination mechanisms,

including civil-military relations, and identify ways and means to support the Government and UNAMA to address the humanitarian concerns.

B. Economy and Government revenue

57. The rate of inflation continues to decline; according to the International Monetary Fund, it was below 4 per cent at the end of 2006. The decline in international energy prices and lack of upward pressure on rents contributed to the decrease. Moreover, the timely distribution of essential foodstuffs by the World Food Programme prevented increases in food prices during the winter. The exchange rate remained stable at approximately 50 Afghanis per United States dollar. Government revenue collection, which was above target in the first two quarters of 2006, slowed in the third quarter to just under six billion Afghanis, compared to the 6.61 billion Afghanis collected in the second quarter. The actual collection recorded for the nine months ending 20 December 2006 was 17.98 billion Afghanis.

58. Development expenditures have picked up thanks to improved implementation and recording, though the budget was approved almost two and a half months into the Afghan year. In the changed security environment, the Government is facing increased pressure to allocate more funds to the security sector in the recurrent budget. This may affect the Government's ability to meet all core operating expenditures from its own resources by 2010/11.

C. Development strategy

59. The sectoral consultative groups, constituted to oversee each of the eight sectors of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, met in October 2006 and January 2007 to review progress towards the benchmarks of the Afghanistan Compact. The consultative groups are guiding 22 technical working and subgroups tasked with developing sector strategies. The Government aims to present a number of sector strategies before the April 2007 meeting of the Afghanistan Development Forum.

VII. Counter-narcotics

60. Opium poppy cultivation and the drug economy continue to grow. While the National Drug Control Strategy was successful in some regions, implementation was unsatisfactory, owing to shortfalls such as insufficient attention to rule-of-law activities and the slow delivery of alternative livelihoods to poppy farmers. While it is expected that the northern provinces will continue to see a drop in cultivation, it is likely that production in southern provinces will further increase.

61. Narcotics trafficking has affected reconstruction by undermining the rule of law, fostering corruption within the Government, and supporting terrorist violence. In Helmand, trafficking alliances contributed to the highest levels of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Notwithstanding efforts to strengthen law enforcement capacity and the ability of the Counter-Narcotics Criminal Justice Task Force to

address drug-related offences and criminal organizations, additional external resources are required.

62. The Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund, a Government-executed fund established in 2006 to mainstream counter-narcotics in Government programmes, has received $42 million out of the $74 million committed. To date, 21 projects have been approved, mostly in the area of rural development and alternative livelihoods. Owing to the challenges faced by the Trust Fund, including weak Government capacity in terms of national execution and financial administrative procedures, only under $1 million was actually disbursed during the reporting period.

63. In November 2006, the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics established a Good Performance Fund to reward the six poppy-free provinces (Ghazni, Logar, Paktika, Paktya, Panjsher and Wardak). Each received $500,000. Additional funds will be provided to eight "good performers" (Bamyan, Kabul, Kapisa, Khost, Kunduz, Laghman, Kunar and Parwan). It is important that funds for the Fund increase, thus providing an incentive to provinces making tangible progress on opium reduction.

VIII. Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board and coordination

64. In its report issued following the mission to Afghanistan in November 2006, the Security Council reaffirmed international support for the Afghanistan Compact. However, it noted that, for the Compact to deliver visible change to the Afghan people, Government-led coordination efforts would need to be strengthened and streamlined. In this regard, Afghan officials and their international partners face a plethora of challenges, including a deteriorating security environment, a proliferation of activities and programmes by disparate actors, and competing political pressures in Afghanistan and abroad. While much remains to be done, tangible progress has been achieved in improving the coordination of assistance to the Afghan people.

65. Since my last report to the Security Council, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board gained momentum as the principal mechanism for facilitating cooperation between the Government of Afghanistan and the international community under the framework of the Afghanistan Compact. The Board held its third meeting in Kabul in November 2006. The meeting, attended by the Security Council mission, identified key priorities to be met if the underlying objectives of the Afghanistan Compact were to remain on track. At the forefront was the reform of the Ministry of the Interior, a prerequisite for stability in the south and south-east of the country. Other areas included aid effectiveness; capacity-building; the strengthening of institutions (particularly in the justice sector); anti-corruption efforts; impunity; and counter-narcotics. The meeting stressed the need for an outcome-based assessment of expenditures by both the donor community and the Government and a new strategy for private sector development. At the third meeting, the Nordic countries, on a rotation basis, were admitted as a member of the Board.

66. The fourth meeting of the Board was held in Berlin, on 30 and 31 January 2007, on the first anniversary of the London Conference, which launched the Afghanistan Compact, and was attended by political directors from foreign ministries. Donors reaffirmed their support for the efforts of the Government to obtain greater ownership of security, reconstruction and development activities. It

was agreed that budget execution would be improved through closer alignment of donor assistance with Government priorities and through enhanced national capacity. The meeting reviewed the ongoing reforms of the Ministry of the Interior and identified fiscal pressures as a key challenge. In support of national elections in 2009, UNAMA was tasked with producing an action plan in coordination with the Afghanistan Independent Election Commission and donors. The Board noted the progress on the 11 short-life benchmarks and accepted limited time extensions for three. At the fourth meeting, Spain was admitted as a member of the Board.

67. Humanitarian assistance coordination at the national level continued under the auspices of the Vice-President through the National Emergency Response Commission and a secretariat provided by the Department of Disaster Preparedness and supported by UNAMA. At the provincial level, efforts continue to centralize relief activities coordinated by the disaster management teams, chaired by the provincial governors. In support of these mechanisms and in recognition of the increased impact of the conflict on civilians, the United Nations intends to increase its humanitarian coordination capacity through the deployment of additional staff to address the changing context and uphold humanitarian principles.

68. UNAMA regional and provincial offices continue to work in support of good governance and well-coordinated development assistance in line with Afghan priorities, continuing to support the Government and its international partners in their efforts to improve the delivery of services to the Afghan population as a whole, and to support efforts at the central level to coordinate and monitor the implementation of the Compact. The UNAMA field presence, a total of 10 locations at the end of the Bonn process, now stands more robust with 17 locations countrywide. This includes five new provincial offices in Badghis, Khost, Kunar, Nimroz and Zabul, opened since August 2006.

IX. Mission operation and support

69. UNAMA will maintain its current presence in 8 regional offices and plans to increase the number of provincial offices from the current 7 (Badakhshan, Badghis, Faryab, Khost, Kunar, Nimroz, and Zabul) to 11. Two new provincial offices in Day Kundi and Ghor should be opened by May 2007, security conditions permitting.

70. The provincial offices use facilities established by UNOPS during the electoral process. They are maintained together with other United Nations agencies on a cost-sharing basis. The liaison offices in Islamabad and Tehran will continue to cover the regional dimension of the peacebuilding process. In order to reduce overhead costs, the Islamabad office is co-located with the United Nations Humanitarian Air Services/WFP and the Tehran office is located in the United Nations common premises building, which is shared by eight United Nations agencies.

71. The enlargement of the Military Advisory Unit proposed in my last report (A/61/326-S/2006/727), was approved by the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly in December 2006. One new Military Liaison Officer has been deployed and another five are under recruitment. In deploying the new Military Liaison Officers, priority is given to the newly established provincial offices. The increase is designed to strengthen liaison with the Afghan security forces and ISAF.

72. In September 2006, a review of the security environment in Afghanistan was undertaken to assess vulnerability of United Nations staff and assets pending further progress in the host country security sector reform. Expansion of UNAMA presence throughout the country requires that security measures and structures be strengthened, particularly in southern and eastern provinces. Supporting expansion of UNAMA will entail meeting the financial implications of related security threat mitigation requirements.

X. Observations

73. **Since my last report, progress was made in several key areas. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board provided an essential forum for the Government and the international community to recommit themselves politically to coordinated and integrated development efforts. At the recent meeting of the Board in January, all participants reaffirmed the centrality of the Board as the coordination mechanism between the Government of Afghanistan and its international partners.**

74. **The insurgency continues to pose a significant challenge to the authority of the Government and presents a danger to civilians and assistance providers alike. The last few months have shown growing responsibilities for the international community in terms of humanitarian assistance and international humanitarian and human rights law. All parties must remain mindful of the need to respect the latter and to protect civilian life.**

75. **The formation of the Policy Action Group has led to much closer coordination of Government and international stakeholders on countering the insurgency in the south. A variety of measures will be critical to leveraging its full potential and permit sustained delivery of development assistance. These might include initiatives aimed at reconciling alienated sections of society. A comprehensive review of the provincial and district administrations is required, with a view to increasing the professionalism and accountability of appointees, while ensuring representation of all principal ethnic groups and subgroups.**

76. **Security incidents in January 2007 in provinces bordering Pakistan were double the number recorded the previous year. Coordinated efforts by the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan to curb incursions into Afghanistan of opposition forces will therefore continue to be vital. Some steps taken by the Government of Pakistan in the last six months are encouraging but further resolute action is still needed.**

77. **The successful completion of the ongoing reforms of the Ministry of the Interior is a precondition for achieving a sustainable peace in Afghanistan, not only through the creation of a more capable and motivated force to prevent insurgency operations and cross-border infiltration, but also to reverse the growth of narcotics trafficking and build public confidence in the rule of law. Monitoring the performance of the new appointees for an initial period can mitigate the risk of recidivism, while adequate resourcing and timely payment of the police will boost effectiveness and retention rates.**

78. **Parliament began to assert its independence and serve as an active counter-weight to the executive branch. Technical assistance to the National**

Assembly will be a key element for future substantive review of legislation by the National Assembly standing committees. Further donor commitment is needed to ensure that Afghanistan will continue to make progress in its democratic transition progress. A substantial funding shortfall for the next elections in 2009 is expected, which would most likely have a negative impact on the future of electoral politics in Afghanistan, if no further funds were made available.

79. While meaningful progress was made in the field of transitional justice, it could be jeopardized by the adoption in both houses of Parliament of the resolution on national reconciliation, which could lead to amnesty for those prosecutable for human rights violations. I welcome President Karzai's launch of the Action Plan on Peace, Justice and Reconciliation in December, which states that no amnesty should be provided for war crimes, crimes against humanity and other gross violations of human rights, and outlines a clear road map for the future. I urge the Afghan Government to maintain this momentum.

80. The narcotics economy, linked both to the insurgency and failures of governance and rule of law, poses a grave threat to reconstruction and nation-building in Afghanistan. An urgent concerted effort by all stakeholders is needed to improve implementation of the national drug control strategy. Tackling the drug industry in Afghanistan must be viewed as part of the overall strategy to build healthy State institutions and restore people's trust in the authority of the Government.

81. Advancing regional cooperation remains a strategic priority for Afghanistan. Institutional frameworks, launched at the Regional Economic Cooperation Conferences in Kabul and New Delhi (and within the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board), require commitment and support within the region and the international community.

82. President Karzai's reaffirmation of support for the disbandment of illegal armed groups programme comes at a critical moment. The redesigned programme will succeed, however, only if Government and international stakeholders cooperate in good faith on its enforcement. Intensified capacity-building of the Ministry of the Interior and, on a case-by-case basis, operational support from NATO/ISAF, will be critical to the implementation of the disbandment programme, as will the Government's readiness to remove office holders with demonstrated links to illegal armed groups.

83. Natural and health hazards and conflict situations represent critical challenges. In support of the longer-term agenda set by the Compact, it is crucial to strengthen the existing humanitarian coordination mechanisms, including with the military and NGOs, to better support national authorities in achieving the targets of the Compact.

84. Steps to improve stakeholder coordination must be implemented on three levels. At the international level, convening an annual forum on the Afghanistan Compact, such as the January 2007 meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board in Berlin, will help ensure that donors remain engaged politically and economically with the Afghan Government. Holding selective, international-level sectoral meetings may also facilitate implementation of the Compact. At the national level, ministries and their

international partners must ensure their representation in the Afghanistan national development strategy consultative and working group meetings by officials of appropriate rank. At the provincial level, an increased focus on capacity-building of Government structures is needed in order to enable greater Afghan oversight and direction of development and humanitarian issues. UNAMA can more readily ensure stakeholder coordination towards this objective through its planned establishment of additional provincial offices, security conditions permitting.

85. **Afghanistan and its international partners once again find themselves at a critical juncture in the country's transition. It is time for the international community to reconfirm its commitment to Afghanistan and to move expeditiously to consolidate the accomplishments of the last six years. UNAMA, together with its Afghan and international counterparts, is well positioned to assist in meeting some of the challenges I outlined in my report. In the coming months, the Mission should focus its efforts on promoting a more coherent international engagement in support of the Afghanistan Compact; strengthening its humanitarian coordination role and contributing to the protection and promotion of human rights, including monitoring the situation of civilians in armed conflict; and extending its good offices role through outreach in Afghanistan and support for regional cooperation. I therefore recommend that the mandate of UNAMA, due to expire on 24 March, be extended for a further 12 months.**

86. **In conclusion, I would like to convey my sincere appreciation to the Security Council and other Member States for their continued support to Afghanistan. I would like to pay tribute to the dedicated efforts of my Special Representative, Tom Koenigs, and to the women and men of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and their partner organizations, who continue to carry out their mission under difficult and increasingly dangerous circumstances. I am grateful for their courage, dedication and commitment.**

United Nations A/61/800

General Assembly

Distr.: General
15 March 2007

Original: English

Sixty-first session
Agenda items 53 and 58

Sustainable development

Operational activities for development: operational activities for development of the United Nations system

Letter dated 14 March 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to the answer by a spokesman for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to questions raised by the Korea Central News Agency on 13 March 2007 with regard to the suspension of operations of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see annex).

The responsibility for the abnormal situation created in the relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and UNDP rest fully with the United States of America and Japan. Some circles inside UNDP, which have taken discriminatory action solely against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, yielding to the pressure of the two above-mentioned countries, cannot avoid accusations for this too.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea will not accept any politically motivated assistance seeking a sinister aim.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda items 53 and 58.

(*Signed*) **Pak** Gil Yon
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

07-27253 (E) 190307

Annex to the letter dated 14 March 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Answer by a spokesman for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to questions raised by the Korea Central News Agency with regard to the suspension of United Nations Development Programme operations in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) recently announced that it had suspended its operations in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and would withdraw its international staff from the UNDP office in Pyongyang.

The DPRK and UNDP have maintained good cooperative relations in the last several decades, but all this has come to an abnormal pass. Who is to blame for this? It is none other than the United States and Japan.

The United States has spread from early this year a far-fetched lie by alleging that the DPRK "misused UNDP programme funds", which is aimed at casting a shadow over the external profile of the DPRK. Japan, taking sides with the United States, has put pressure to bear on UNDP to help cut off development assistance to the DPRK and was hell-bent on reopening the discussion on the already-approved country programme for the DPRK by instigating certain member States of the UNDP Executive Board.

Some circles on the part of UNDP also can't feel free from this abnormal situation in the relations between the DPRK and UNDP, because they showed a discriminatory attitude only to the DPRK by giving in to the pressure from the United States and Japan.

UNDP, as it says, is an organization whose mission is to offer development assistance to developing countries. Some officials in the agency, however, contrary to the UNDP mission, have succumbed to outside pressure and tried to revise the country programme for the DPRK from development assistance to assistance of a humanitarian nature, and even went to the length of unilaterally closing or cancelling the ongoing projects.

As regards this discriminatory step taken against the country programme for the DPRK only, it demanded a clarification and an explanation from UNDP, which, however, says nothing, deliberately avoiding the answer.

It clearly shows that UNDP is not in a position to answer, as its behaviour falls short of its mission.

It does not make any difference for the DPRK whether or not it receives assistance from UNDP, which does not hold a great amount. But it will never tolerate any foolish attempt to hurt its dignity.

It is the unshakeable stand of the DPRK not to receive any politically motivated assistance seeking a sinister aim in the future, too.

United Nations A/61/801

General Assembly

Distr.: General
15 March 2007

Original: English

Sixty-first session
Agenda item 117
Programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007

Review of the standards of travel and entitlements for staff members, members of organs and subsidiary organs of the United Nations and entities of the United Nations system

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The current report, mandated by General Assembly resolution 60/255, outlines the results of a survey conducted by the secretariat of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination on the existing standards of travel in place throughout the system. It indicates that while in some areas organizations have moved in a similar direction, for example the implementation of lump sum payment for many categories of travel, significant diversity remains within the policies of organization in the travel area.

07-27247 (E) 030407

I. Introduction

1. As global organizations, entities of the United Nations system require many of their staff members to travel, whether to meetings or conferences, for programme delivery activities or for monitoring and evaluation work. Beyond travel for work, those entities are obliged to transport new staff members and their families to their duty stations (appointment travel), and back after the conclusion of their contracts (separation travel). During their term of service, staff and their family members are entitled to home leave travel and their children to education travel. In certain circumstances, agencies provide other categories of travel, such as medical evacuation and relocation for security purposes.

2. To regulate such travel, each United Nations entity develops policies that guide the standards to be used for different types of travel. While many entities share similar policies, there continue to be inconsistencies across the United Nations system. In 2004, the Joint Inspection Unit studied the range of travel policies in place and its report on the harmonization of the conditions of travel throughout the United Nations system (A/60/78), along with the comments of the Secretary-General and the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) thereon (A/60/78/Add.1) were considered by the General Assembly at its sixtieth session. In its resolution 60/255 (sect. IV, para. 2), the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to initiate, within the framework of CEB, a review of the standards of travel and entitlements for staff members, members of organs and subsidiary organs of the United Nations and organizations of the United Nations system, with a view to adopting a common policy at the United Nations system level.

3. The current report, in response to this request, provides the results of a survey conducted by the secretariat of CEB on the current status of the travel policies and practices in place across the system. The survey, carried out in late 2006, was distributed through the inter-agency travel manager's network to approximately 38 intergovernmental organizations, both within and outside the United Nations system. A total of 17 entities (16 from the United Nations system and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) responded. The survey results are summarized in annex II and provide an updated picture of the variation in travel policies in the two years since the Joint Inspection Unit report.

II. Mission travel accommodation

4. Mission travel is the category used when United Nations staff members travel in their official capacity. As noted in the 2004 Joint Inspection Unit report, many studies over the years have focused on the standard of accommodation provided to staff members while on this type of travel. While consistency of standards prevails within the United Nations Secretariat and most of the funds and programmes, the specialized agencies and other bodies of the United Nations family do not appear to have achieved any significant level of harmonization in this area.

5. The survey first asked entities to report if the class of travel (first, business, or economy) provided to staff members differed depending on grade level and journey duration. With regard to the standards at the grade level, only one responding entity within the United Nations family, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical

Weapons, provides the same accommodation to all staff members at every level. Several organizations (the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), International Labour Organization (ILO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and World Tourism Organization) explicitly indicated that their executive heads travel in first class. The class of service for officials below executive head, but above the D-2 level, can vary. At FAO, senior officials (those above a D-2 level) receive business class accommodation for flights of any duration, while at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), officials above the D-2 level receive first class on flights longer than seven hours, otherwise they receive business class. UNESCO provides business class for officials above the D-2 level for all flights within Europe and the Mediterranean region, otherwise they also receive first class. One organization, the Universal Postal Union (UPU), offers first class accommodation for the executive head (Director-General), and the Deputy Director-General; however the UPU reports these individuals normally elect to travel in business class.

6. Almost all organizations provide a different class of air accommodation based on the length of the journey, especially at the D-2 level and below (see table 2). The norm for many agencies is largely consistent with the rules for the United Nations Secretariat, funds and programmes, where business class is applied for duty trips of longer than nine hours, with economy class the standard for shorter journeys. However, variations do exist. IAEA uses seven hours as the demarcation between business and economy class. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the World Tourism Organization use 10 hours. UNESCO uses eight hours and has the further provision that for trips between their headquarters locations (Paris) and New York, staff members may use business class. UPU provides economy class for all staff members at the D-2 level and below for journeys of any length, except upon special request and at the approval of the executive head.

7. The application of business class travel based on journey length has been discussed in several forums, including the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC), which last considered the issue, along with other aspects of travel policy, in 1997. In its annual report of that year, ICSC notes that most decisions regarding travel policy are best "left to the legislative/governing bodies of the individual organizations to sort out in consultation with their respective executive heads".[1] However, ICSC went on to suggest that "for flights of six or more hours' duration it was reasonable to consider an upgrade from economy to business class".[2] The report notes that during its discussion, the Commission considered the contribution of the United Nations Medical Director, who noted that the medical directors of the entities of the United Nations system supported business class accommodation for journeys of six hours or longer. As can be seen from the results of the Joint Inspection Unit report and this follow-up survey, entities generally do not follow the six-hour ICSC guideline for business class accommodation.

[1] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-second Session, Supplement No. 30* (A/52/30), para. 275 (c).

[2] Ibid., para. 275 (d) (i).

8. Beyond the class of travel, the survey asked entities to indicate whether or not their policies provide for stopovers and rest on arrival. As noted in annex II, most entities allow for both stopovers and rest on arrival.

III. Non-mission travel

9. Other than for travel on missions, entities have policies that support a wide range of travel categories. The survey examined five of these; appointment, separation, home leave, education and change of duty station. Entities were asked to indicate if the policies for these categories differed from those of mission travel and, if so, to provide details on how they differed.

10. The survey found that for appointment travel, entities generally apply the same rules as for mission travel but with some variation, mostly by offering the traveller a lump sum payment instead of ticket. For example, at FAO the traveller has the choice between a ticket based on the mission travel rules or a lump sum payment of 80 per cent of the full applicable airfare; business class if over nine hours; or full economy class if less than nine hours. At UNESCO, the traveller can also choose between a ticket and a lump sum payment. However, this agency does not base the ticket on the mission travel rules. Instead, UNESCO offers either an economy class ticket for any journey length or a lump sum payment of 60 per cent of the full economy airfare. Not all entities offer a lump sum option; for example, ILO does not offer this option to staff on appointment or separation travel.

11. For separation travel, almost all entities responding to the survey apply the same rules as for appointment travel. The one exception was UPU, where lump sum payment is available to the traveller for separation, but not for travel on appointment.

12. Similar variations in policies across the system exist for three other categories of travel — home leave, education and change of duty station. At FAO, for example, the rules for home leave and change of duty station travel are the same as for appointment travel, as noted above, but for education travel, business class is not available. ILO offers a lump sum payment for education and home leave travel; otherwise, a traveller can choose the option of a ticket, which is based on the mission travel rules (business class over seven hours, otherwise economy class). At IAEA, the traveller can choose either the option of a ticket, based on the mission travel rules, or a lump sum payment, but the payment for home leave travel is 75 per cent of the full economy fare, while for education or change of duty station travel the payment is 65 per cent of the full economy fare. In general, more entities offer a lump sum payment for these categories of travel than for appointment and separation. According to the survey results, neither IFAD nor the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) offer a lump sum payment option for appointment and separation travel, but this option is available for home leave and education travel.

13. While not exploring other travel categories in depth, the survey requested entities to indicate if they had policies that recognize an additional seven categories: reverse education (in which a parent visits a child at school, as opposed to education travel, which brings the child to and from school); medical evacuation; security evacuation; rest and recuperation; breastfeeding mothers; single parents; and domestic partners. As can be seen in annex II, only three responding entities, the

United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Population Fund and the United Nations Office at Vienna, recognized all seven of these. Of these seven categories, medical and security evacuation were recognized by the most entities, with only two entities, UPU and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, not recognizing these as separate travel categories. Single parents was a category recognized by the fewest entities, with breastfeeding mothers, single parents and domestic partners recognized by five organizations each.

IV. Representatives of Member States

14. Beyond travel for staff members, the CEB survey also endeavoured to assess the diversity of rules for travel of non-staff members and specifically asked if entities provided travel benefits for representatives of Member States and, if so, to describe the standard of accommodation. Nine of the 16 of the responding entities indicated that representatives of Member States received travel benefits of some kind. For some entities, the standard is very detailed. For example, UNDP reports that all representatives receive business class for travel over nine hours and economy class for trips of under nine hours. UNESCO reports that the Heads of the Executive Board and the General Conference always travel in first class and members of the Executive Board always travel in business class, while UNHCR and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization both indicate that the rules for representatives of Member States follow the same rules as staff members.

15. Finally, to judge the complexity that United Nations entities may face when trying to alter travel policies, the survey requested entities to indicate the travel policy decision-making body and were asked whether decisions of this nature were made by the governing body, the executive head or both. Only three entities, two from the United Nations Secretariat (the United Nations Office at Vienna and the United Nations Office at Nairobi) and the United Nations Children's Fund, indicated that these decisions come from the governing body. Six entities indicated that the executive head could set these policies, while a further six indicated that these decisions were made in concert by both the executive head and the governing body.

V. Conclusions

16. The current review of travel policies initiated by the Chief Executives Board for Coordination focused on several specific policy areas, including the factors that determine the class of air travel for missions, the standard for stopovers and rest on arrival, the rules for non-mission travel, whether or not an entity recognizes different types of travel and whether or not an entity provides travel entitlements for Member State representatives. Based on the results, it is clear that very little has changed within the United Nations system in terms of travel policy since the 2004 Joint Inspection Unit report. Travel policies continue to differ across the system, sometimes substantially, but mostly in the area of mission travel. For other categories of travel, the introduction of the lump sum payment options appears to have lessened the differential somewhat, although the basis upon which these payments are made can vary from entity to entity.

Annex I

Standard of air travel for D-2 level staff and below: minimum length of journey for business class

Agency	*Hours*
International Labour Organization (ILO)	7
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)	9
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	8
Universal Postal Union (UPU)	None
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)	2.5
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)	9
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	7
World Tourism Organization (WTO)	10
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	9
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	9
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	9
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)	9
United Nations Office at Vienna (UNOV)	9
United Nations Office at Nairobi (UNON)	9
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA)	9
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	10
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)	7

Annex II

United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination

Chief Executives Board for Coordination travel policy review[a]

	ILO	FAO	UNESCO	UPU	IFAD	UNIDO	IAEA	WTO	UNDP	UNHCR	UNICEF	UNFPA	UNOV	UNON	ESCWA	OPCW	OSCE
Travel policy decision-making body:																	
Governing body											X		X	X			X
Executive		X		X	X		X			X					X		
Together	X		X			X		X	X			X				X	
For mission travel, does class of air accommodation depend on:																	
Length of journey	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Level of staff	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
For mission travel, does standard allow for:																	
Allow stopovers	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X		X	
Allow rest on arrival	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Rules differ from mission travel for:																	
Appointment		X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X				X	X
Separation		X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X				X	X
Home leave	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Education	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Change of duty station		X	X			X	X		X			X					X
Entity provides for:																	
Reverse education	X	X	X						X	X	X	X	X	X			X
Medical evacuation	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Security evaluation	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X
Rest and recuperation	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X				X
Breastfeeding		X							X		X	X	X				

	ILO	FAO	UNESCO	UPU	IFAD	UNIDO	IAEA	WTO	UNDP	UNHCR	UNICEF	UNFPA	UNOV	UNON	ESCWA	OPCW	OSCE
Single parents									X		X	X	X				
Domestic partners									X	X		X	X	X			X
Travel for representatives of Member States			X		X	X			X	X	X		X	X	X		

[*] See annex I for the full names of entities participating in the review.

United Nations

A/61/802

General Assembly

Distr.: General
16 March 2007

Original: English

Sixty-first session
Agenda item 151
Financing of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste

Proposed budget of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste for the period from 25 August 2006 to 30 June 2007

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

Initial proposal for the period 25 August 2006 to 31 March 2007	$172,528,600
Authorized by the General Assembly in resolution 61/249*	$170,221,100
Proposal submitted by the Secretary-General for the period 25 August 2006 to 30 June 2007	$194,565,300
Recommendation of the Advisory Committee for the period 25 August 2006 to 30 June 2007	$184,819,900

* Commitment authority.

07-27274 (E) 190307

I. Introduction

1. **The recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions set out in paragraphs 8, 18, 19 and 22 below would entail a reduction of $9,745,400 in the proposed budget of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) for the period from 25 August 2006 to 30 June 2007. The Committee also makes a number of observations and recommendations regarding the administration and management of the Mission and opportunities for further savings.**

2. During its consideration of the proposed budget, the Committee met with the Deputy Special Representative and other representatives of the Secretary-General. The documents used by the Committee in its consideration of the financing of UNMIT are listed at the end of the present report.

3. In its resolution 1704 (2006), the Security Council decided to establish UNMIT as a follow-on mission for an initial period of six months, with the intention of renewing for further periods, and also decided that UNMIT would consist of an appropriate civilian component, including up to 1,608 police personnel, and up to 34 military liaison and staff officers. The mandate of UNMIT is set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 1704 (2006). By its resolution 1745 (2007), the Council, inter alia, extended the mandate of the Mission to 26 February 2008 and decided to increase the Mission's authorized force strength by up to 140 police personnel in order to permit the deployment of an additional formed police unit to supplement the existing units, particularly during the pre- and post-electoral period. The presidential election is expected to be held in April 2007. The date of the parliamentary elections will be announced later.

4. In its resolution 61/249, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for UNMIT for the period from 25 August 2006 to 31 March 2007 in a total amount not exceeding $170,221,100, inclusive of $49,961,500 previously authorized by the Committee, and decided to assess the amount of $170,221,100 on Member States.

II. Information on performance for the current period

5. The Committee was informed that, as at 27 February 2007, a total of $141,636,000 had been assessed on Member States in respect of UNMIT. Payments received as at the same date amounted to $8,168,000, leaving an outstanding balance of $133,468,000. As at the same date, the cash position of the Mission was $12,500,000 and current loans from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund amounted to $40,000,000. **The Committee expresses its concern regarding the precarious cash-flow situation of the Mission.**

6. The Committee was informed that liabilities for formed police units for 2006 amounted to $1,738,000, with no payments having yet been made. Liabilities for contingent-owned equipment and self-sustainment for 2006 amount to $1,444,000, with no certified claims having yet been received.

7. The Committee was informed that, as at 28 February 2007, the incumbency for UNMIT was as follows:

	Authorized/proposed	*Encumbered*
Military observers	34	33
United Nations police	1 045	892
Formed police units[a]	703	563
International staff	469	192
National staff	1 136	673
United Nations Volunteers	386	214

[a] Includes 140 police personnel authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 1745 (2007) (see also para. 11 below).

8. Upon request, the Committee was provided with current and projected expenditures for the period from 25 August 2006 to 30 June 2007. Current expenditure as at 5 March 2007 amounts to $67.6 million against the approved commitment authority of $170.2 million, or 40 per cent for a financial period which is more than 80 per cent complete. This represents a significant underexpenditure. The Committee's doubts concerning the actual cash requirements of the Mission were reflected in its recommendation set out in paragraph 25 of its previous report on the financing of UNMIT (A/61/567) that assessment be limited to 50 per cent of the commitment authority. The Committee notes that the expenditure projected for the period from 6 March to 30 June 2007 corresponds precisely to the envisaged unencumbered balance of $126,953,000. **The Committee continues to doubt the capacity of the Mission to utilize all the requested resources. It therefore recommends a reduction of 5 per cent in the proposed budget for the period from 25 August 2006 to 30 June 2007. Should the appropriation prove insufficient, further requirements would be reported in the context of the performance report.**

III. Proposed budget for the period from 25 August 2006 to 30 June 2007

9. At the time of the Committee's consideration of the request for commitment authority in November 2006 (see A/61/519 and A/61/567), the Secretary-General indicated that the full budget for the Mission for the 2006/07 period would be submitted to the Committee in mid-February 2007 and to the General Assembly in March 2007, some seven months into the financial period "in view of the recent establishment of the Mission and the time required for the preparation of the results-based budgeting frameworks and determination of its full resource requirements for the 2006/07 period" (see A/61/519, para. 3). The Committee has commented extensively on the implications that such a delay has for proper budget practice (see A/61/567, paras. 6-11).

10. The proposed budget for UNMIT for the period from 25 August 2006 to 30 June 2007 as contained in document A/61/759 amounts to $194,565,300 gross ($190,723,100 net). The budget provides for the deployment of 34 military liaison and staff officers, 1,608 police personnel, including 1,045 United Nations police officers and 563 formed police personnel, 469 international staff, 1,136 national staff and 386 United Nations Volunteers.

11. As noted above, by its resolution 1745 (2007) the Security Council decided to increase the authorized strength of formed police units by up to 140 personnel. Owing to the timing of the preparation of the proposed budget and the adoption of resolution 1745 (2007), related resource requirements were not included in the budget. By a letter dated 1 March 2007, the Officer-in-Charge of the Office for Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts informed the Committee that it was intended to absorb the additional requirements from within the appropriation for UNMIT for the 2006/07 period to be approved by the General Assembly. The Officer-in-Charge further informed the Committee that, should additional resources in excess of the appropriation be required, funds would be sought in the context of the Mission's budget performance report for the 2006/07 period. Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that the cost of deploying the additional 140 personnel was estimated at $3.5 million. The Committee was subsequently informed that it was intended to absorb additional projected expenditures through the utilization of projected unencumbered balances relating to the delayed deployment of aircraft. **The Committee expects these projected expenditures to be duly absorbed.**

A. Military and police personnel

Category	*Authorized/proposed 25 August 2006-31 March 2007*	*Authorized/proposed 25 August 2006-30 June 2007*
Military observers	34	34
United Nations police	1 045	1 045
Formed police units	563	703[a]

[a] Includes 140 additional formed police personnel authorized under Security Council resolution 1745 (2007).

12. The estimated requirements for military and police personnel for the period from 25 August 2006 to 30 June 2007 amount to $35,320,900 ($1,106,700 for military observers, $21,321,500 for United Nations police and $12,892,700 for formed police units). The estimates are based on projected average strengths of 32 military liaison and staff officers and 791 United Nations police officers, with the application of delayed deployment factors of 5 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively for the period. The provision for formed police units takes into account the deployment of two formed police units in September 2006, one unit at the end of October 2006 and one at the end of February 2007. The units are each comprised of approximately 140 personnel. An additional unit of 80 personnel will be deployed at the end of March, with the possibility of a further 60 personnel at a later time.

B. Civilian personnel

Category	*Proposed 25 August 2006–30 June 2007*
International staff	457[a]
National staff	1 128[b]
United Nations Volunteers	386

[a] Excludes one P-4 and one P-3 in the Security Section funded by the United Nations country team through cost-sharing arrangements, as well as 10 temporary positions to be funded under general temporary assistance for the Conduct and Discipline Team and Internal Oversight Office (1 P-5, 4 P-4, 2 P-3, 1 P-2 and 2 Field Service).

[b] Excludes five national General Service posts in the Security Section funded by United Nations country team through cost-sharing arrangements, as well as 3 positions to be funded under general temporary assistance for the Conduct and Discipline Team and Internal Oversight Office (1 National Officer and 2 national General Service).

13. Estimated requirements for civilian personnel amount to $37,445,200 ($26,587,700 for international staff, $3,252,100 for national staff and $7,605,400 for United Nations Volunteers). The provisions reflect the application of vacancy factors of 50 per cent for 91 international staff under recruitment as of 31 January 2007 and 75 per cent for an additional 207 international staff, 40 per cent for national staff and 20 per cent for United Nations Volunteers. The proposed organizational structure is set out in paragraphs 15 to 129 and annex I of the report of the Secretary-General (A/61/759).

14. **The Committee cautions against routinely using a standard template in determining the structure and staffing levels of missions, including the number and grade levels of posts. In this connection, the Committee reiterates that missions of different dimensions, scope of activities and components have different requirements that should be reflected in structures specifically tailored to the needs of each mission (see A/61/567, para. 17).**

15. **The Committee also points out that a number of special circumstances should have been taken into account in planning for the staffing of UNMIT. For example, given the strong presence of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in Timor-Leste, care should be taken to avoid duplicating functions and structures that already exist within the country team. The Committee recommends that the proposed budget for 2007/08 make clear the arrangements for coordination and cooperation between the United Nations country team and the Mission. Furthermore, the possibility that both presidential and parliamentary elections may be concluded by the end of the financial period should be taken into account in planning for future staffing and structures.**

16. The Committee notes that in the proposed budget, both post and non-post requirements are often asserted and not justified. **In line with the considerations set out in paragraph 15 above, the Committee urges a careful review by the Mission and at Headquarters of the staffing requirements for UNMIT.**

Recommendations on posts

17. Two Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (one for Security Sector Support and Rule of Law and the other for Governance Support, Development and Humanitarian Coordination) are requested at the Assistant Secretary-General level. The Committee understands that the responsibilities of the Deputy Special Representative for Governance Support, Development and Humanitarian Coordination include providing leadership to the United Nations assistance for the presidential and parliamentary electoral processes in Timor-Leste (see A/61/759, para. 37). **The Committee believes that the requirement for two Assistant Secretary-General level posts should be re-examined after the elections. It therefore recommends that the grade level of the Deputy Special Representative for Governance Support, Development and Humanitarian Coordination be reviewed in the context of the budget for 2007/08.**

18. The Committee notes from the organizational chart contained in annex I A of the budget the proposal that a number of substantive offices, including the Political Affairs Office, the Communications and Public Information Office and the Planning and Best Practices Unit, would report to the Chief of Staff. **The Committee sees no justification for these reporting arrangements, which constitute an additional and unnecessary bureaucratic layer in a mission the size of UNMIT. The Committee recommends, therefore, that the functions of the Chief of Staff be revised to comprise more traditional duties and that the post be established at the D-1 rather than the D-2 level.**

19. A D-1 post is requested for the Chief Political Affairs Officer. The responsibilities of the post would include assisting the Special Representative and senior management of the Mission in their contacts with Timorese authorities, political parties and civil society; the facilitation of regular contacts between key national and international actors; and the maintenance of regular liaison with the diplomatic community, Government officials and entities of the United Nations system in Timor-Leste (see A/61/759, para. 43). **The Committee believes that the need for a D-1 level post has not been adequately justified. Therefore, in line with the considerations set out in paragraph 15 above, the Committee recommends that the level for the Chief Political Affairs Officer be set at the P-5 level.**

20. The Committee notes that the proposed staffing of the Conduct and Discipline Team is to consist of a Senior Conduct and Discipline Officer at the P-5 level, two Conduct and Discipline Officers at the P-2 level, an Associate Reports Officer at the P-2 level, a National Conduct and Discipline Officer (National Officer) and two Administrative Assistants (one Field Service and one national General Service) to be funded under general temporary assistance. **The Committee recommends that the staffing of the Team be reviewed on the basis of workload and that the results of that review be reflected in the proposed budget for 2007/08.**

21. The proposed staffing of the Internal Oversight Office comprises two Resident Auditors (1 P-4 and 1 P-3), an Auditing Assistant (Field Service), two Investigators (1 P-4 and 1 P-3) and a Language Assistant (national General Service) to be funded under general temporary assistance. **The Committee recommends that the staffing of the Office be reviewed on the basis of risk assessment and that the results of that review be reflected in the proposed budget for 2007/08.**

22. The establishment of a D-2 post is proposed for the Police Commissioner owing to the Mission's robust police mandate. The Police Commissioner is to be supported by two Deputy Police Commissioners at the D-1 level, one for operations and the other for administration and development. **The Committee recommends the establishment of a D-2 post for the Police Commissioner and a D-1 post for the Deputy Police Commissioner for Operations. The incumbent of the D-1 post should assume the duties and responsibilities of the Police Commissioner in his/her absence, as indicated in paragraph 75 of the report of the Secretary-General (A/61/759). As regards the post relating to administration and development, the Committee is not convinced that the related responsibilities warrant the D-1 level. Accordingly, the Committee recommends that it be established at the P-5 level.**

C. Operational costs

(United States dollars)

Approved 25 August 2006-31 March 2007	*Proposed 25 August 2006-30 June 2007*
106 609 000	121 799 200

23. Estimated requirements under facilities and infrastructure amount to $35,582,100. The Committee recalls that during the administrative transition from the United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor (UNMISET) and the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), a total of seven properties were handed over to the Government of Timor-Leste, seven were retained for use by UNOTIL and one office was closed (see A/60/789, para. 10). Upon request, the Committee was provided with information concerning the UNOTIL facilities taken over by UNMIT (see annex).

24. The estimated requirements for ground transportation of $23,154,900 provide for the acquisition of 801 additional vehicles, for a total fleet of 839 vehicles. Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that many of the vehicles carried over from UNOTIL had high mileage or were in a condition which rendered their repair and maintenance uneconomical. The Committee was further informed that the size of the vehicle fleet was determined on the basis of the Mission's operational requirements and that the mission-specific ratios were below the standard ratios.

25. Estimated requirements of $13,236,600 provide for the establishment of a fleet of seven commercially contracted aircraft, comprising two fixed-wing passenger aircraft and five medium helicopters. The aircraft are to be used, inter alia, for intra-theatre passenger flights and logistics flights for mail, passenger transportation, resupply and maintenance of infrastructure and communications systems; medical evacuation; deployment of United Nations police, military liaison groups and civilian and electoral staff; intra-theatre support of rotations; VIP flights; aerial reconnaissance and observation; and support for the electoral process. The Committee was informed that the delayed deployment of aircraft would permit the absorption of the costs of the deployment of the 140 additional formed police personnel authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 1745 (2007) (see also para. 11 above).

IV. Conclusion

26. The action to be taken by the General Assembly in connection with the financing of UNMIT for the period from 25 August 2006 to 30 June 2007 is indicated in paragraph 150 of the proposed budget (A/61/759). **Taking into account its recommendations set out in paragraphs 8, 18, 19 and 22 above, the Committee recommends that the estimated budget requirement of $194,565,300 be reduced by $9,745,400. Accordingly, the Committee recommends that the Assembly appropriate for UNMIT an amount of $184,819,900 for the period from 25 August 2006 to 30 June 2007.**

Documentation

- Budget for the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste for the period from 25 August 2006 to 30 June 2007 (A/61/759)
- Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on the financing of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste for the period from 25 August 2006 to 31 March 2007 (A/61/567)
- General Assembly resolution 61/249
- Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 9 August 2006 to 26 January 2007) (S/2007/50)
- Security Council resolutions 1704 (2006) and 1745 (2007)

Annex

UNOTIL facilities taken over by UNMIT

Property No.	*District*	*Property and location*	*Remarks*
1	Dili	SRSG's residence	Minor refurbishment required.
2	Dili	Obrigado barracks	Major refurbishment and new construction to accommodate additional staffing requirements of UNMIT.
3	Dili	UNMISET 100 man camp-Airport	Refurbished, occupied by UNMIT Movement Control Section.
4	Bobonaro	Regional support centre (RSC)	Retained pending construction of a new RSC at a new site in Maliana.
5	Cova Lima	Regional support centres	Being refurbished.
6	Oecussi	Regional support centres	Being refurbished.
7	Darwin	Liaison Office	No refurbishment required, however, local authorities requested return of premises. UNMIT has been in negotiations with them for replacement premises.

United Nations A/61/803

General Assembly

Distr.: General
16 March 2007

Original: English

Sixty-first session
Agenda item 144 (b)
Financing of the United Nations peacekeeping forces in the Middle East: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

(United States dollars)

Initial appropriation for 2006/07	93,526,200
Approved commitment authority for 2006/07	257,340,400
Total approved funding for 2006/07	350,866,600
Revised budget for 2006/07	522,753,200
Recommendation of the Advisory Committee for 2006/07	496,615,500

I. Introduction

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered the report of the Secretary-General on the financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 (A/61/766). During its consideration of the report, the Advisory Committee met with the Deputy Force Commander and other representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information.

2. In its resolution 1701 (2006), the Security Council decided, in order to supplement and enhance the Force in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations, to authorize an increase in the force strength of UNIFIL to a maximum of 15,000 troops. In the same resolution, the Council extended the mandate of the Force until 31 August 2007 and decided that, in addition to the mandate under resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), the mandate would include monitoring of the cessation of hostilities, accompanying and supporting the deployment of the

07-27302 (E) 200307

Lebanese Armed Forces, as they deployed through southern Lebanon and assisting the Government of Lebanon in securing its borders and other entry points.

3. The report of the Secretary-General contains a revised budget for UNIFIL for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, which amounts to $522,753,200 for the maintenance and expansion of the mission. The budget provides for the phased deployment of 14,790 military contingent personnel, 406 international staff and 696 national staff, including 23 National officers. That budget supersedes the original budget for the same period contained in the report of the Secretary-General dated 3 January 2006 (A/60/642).

4. The General Assembly, by its resolution 60/278, appropriated the amount of $93,526,200 for the maintenance of UNIFIL for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, as well as an amount of $3,348,000 for the support account for peacekeeping operations and $705,400 for the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy. A request was submitted to the Advisory Committee on 14 August 2006 to enter into commitments in an amount not exceeding $50 million to meet the most immediate and essential preparatory steps for the expansion of UNIFIL, in particular the rapid deployment of additional troops and their equipment, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). The Committee concurred with the request.

5. The General Assembly, by its resolution 61/250, authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments in a total amount not exceeding $257,340,400 for the expansion of the Force for the period from 1 July 2006 to 31 March 2007, inclusive of the amount of $50 million previously authorized by the Advisory Committee under the terms of section IV of Assembly resolution 49/233 A and in addition to the amount of $97,579,600 already appropriated for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 under the terms of its resolution 60/278. By the same resolution, the Assembly decided to apportion among Member States the amount of $257,340,400.

II. Financial performance report for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006

6. The Advisory Committee was informed that the preparation and submission of the performance report for UNIFIL for the period ended 30 June 2006 was delayed owing to the urgent and consecutive preparation of the Secretary-General's request for the financing of the Force for the period from 1 July 2006 to 31 March 2007 (A/61/588), which was considered during the main part of the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, and the new proposed budget for UNIFIL for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 (A/61/766). The Committee was informed that the performance report for UNIFIL for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006 would be submitted in conjunction with the proposed budget for the Force for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008.

III. Information on performance for the current period

7. Upon request, the Advisory Committee was provided with current and projected expenditures for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007. Expenditure as at 5 March 2007 amounted to $227.4 million, including obligations of $170.1 million, or 74.8 per cent, and disbursements of $57.3 million, or 25.2 per cent. The total expenditure of $227.4 million represents about 65 per cent of the approved funding of $350.9 million for a financial period that is more than 90 per cent complete. The Committee notes that the expenditure of $295.3 million projected for the period from 6 March to 30 June 2007 corresponds precisely to the envisaged unencumbered balance of $295.3 million (see also para. 9 below). Information provided to the Committee on the deployment of personnel of UNIFIL as at 5 March 2007 is contained in annex I.

IV. Revised budget for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007

8. The Advisory Committee notes that the proposed resource requirements of $522.8 million are linked to the Force's objectives through results-based-budgeting frameworks, grouped by the components operations and support. Proposed human resources are reported by component, with the exception of executive direction and management, which is attributed to the Force as a whole.

9. **The Advisory Committee recognizes that the expanded mandate of UNIFIL and its increased operations do require an increase in the mission's substantive and support components. Given the timing of the submission and consideration of the revised budget for UNIFIL for the period 2006/07, it is unlikely that the proposed staffing for the Force for that period could be put in place and associated operational costs could be fully utilized within the budget period that ends on 30 June 2007. The Committee was informed that less than 30 per cent ($61.1 million) of the total provision of $215.9 million for operational costs had been utilized as at 5 March. The Committee recommends a reduction of 5 per cent in the proposed budget for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007. Should the appropriation prove insufficient, further requirements would be reported in the context of the performance report.**

10. **The Advisory Committee discerns a tendency in the proposed budget and other submissions to assert resource requirements and not fully explain or justify them. The Committee expects that the Secretary-General's proposals for 2007/08 will provide an analysis of the capacity required to undertake the Force's mandated activities. The Committee does not interpose, at this stage, objections to the proposed staffing structure of UNIFIL as a whole, subject to its specific observations and recommendations. It will revert to its consideration of the staffing structure of the Force in the context of its review of the budget for UNIFIL for the period 2007/08 and in the light of such additional information and clarifications as may be provided in response to requests contained in the report.**

A. Recommendations on staffing requirements

1. Regional Oversight Office and Conduct and Discipline Team

11. The Advisory Committee was not in a position to ascertain whether or not the risks and complexity of operations had been fully taken into account in estimating staffing requirements for the Regional Oversight Office of UNIFIL. The Committee recalls in this connection that the Board of Auditors, in its report on the accounts of United Nations peacekeeping operations for the period ended 30 June 2005,[1] observed that the allocation of resident auditors to missions was based only on expenditure levels, while such factors as the risks and complexity of operations were not fully considered when deploying resources. **The Committee trusts that staffing resources for the Regional Oversight Office of UNIFIL will be justified for the budget period 2007/08 on the basis of an analysis of the risks and complexity of operations**. In that context, it was informed that no personnel conduct issues had so far been raised at UNIFIL. **The Committee recommends that the staffing of the Conduct and Discipline Team be reviewed on the basis of workload. The Committee trusts that the next budget submission will provide the results of such a review**.

2. Strategic Military Cell

12. In connection with the Strategic Military Cell at United Nations Headquarters, which would comprise four positions funded under general temporary assistance (1 D-2, 1 D-1 and 2 General Service (Other level)) and 29 military staff officers, the Advisory Committee recalls its observation that the cost of providing backstopping requirements at Headquarters should not be charged, even temporarily, to the budgets of peacekeeping operations (see A/61/616, para. 13). The Committee also notes that the Secretary-General in his report to the Security Council stated that a military cell dedicated to UNIFIL would draw on the existing resources of the Military Division (S/2006/670, para. 39). The Committee observes a possible inconsistency between that report and the budget document (A/61/766).

3. Components: operations and support

13. A total of 61 posts, reflecting an increase of 36 international and 21 national posts, are proposed under component 1, operations. The proposed staffing requirements under component 2, support, include a total of 1,028 posts and 180 general temporary assistance positions (7 for the Conduct and Discipline Team and 173 interpreters for military contingents). This would involve an increase of 247 posts and 5 general temporary assistance positions in the category of international staff and 335 posts and 175 general temporary assistance positions in the category of national staff.

14. **In reviewing these proposals, the Advisory Committee notes that the support component provides for 247 Field Service posts. The Committee recalls its view on the need for greater use, where appropriate and feasible, of national staff in peacekeeping operations. In that context, it requests that a review be undertaken to see which functions currently proposed for Field Service staff**

[1] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixtieth Session, Supplement No. 5* and corrigendum (A/60/5 (Vol. II) and Corr.1), chap. II.

could appropriately be carried out by national staff. Moreover, the Committee recommends that a review be undertaken to see which functions proposed for international Professional staff could appropriately be carried out by national staff. The Committee expects that the results of these reviews will be reflected in the proposed budget for UNIFIL for 2007/08.

15. The Advisory Committee notes that each of the two liaison offices outside Naqoura would be supported by staff of the Finance Section for the purpose of approving and effecting disbursements for personnel in the sectors and in the liaison offices. **The Committee trusts that the budget for 2007/08 will provide detailed information on the support provided by staff of the Finance Section to personnel in the sectors and in the liaison offices.**

16. **The Advisory Committee finds it difficult to analyse the responsibilities of the sector administrative offices, as it is not clear how they relate to the administrative functions performed at the headquarters at Naqoura or to the support provided by staff of the Finance Section to personnel in the sectors and in the two liaison offices outside Naqoura (see para. 15). The Committee requests that this be clarified in the next budget for UNIFIL.**

B. Resource requirements

1. Military and police personnel

17. The estimated requirements of $265.7 million under military and police personnel provide for standard troop-cost reimbursement, deployment, rotation and repatriation travel of military contingent personnel, standard recreational and daily allowances, rations, reimbursement for contingent-owned equipment and related freight costs based on the phased deployment of 14,790 troops by 30 June 2007. The requirements include daily subsistence allowance for 29 military staff officers to be deployed at the Strategic Military Cell at Headquarters. Requirements are based on the actual deployment of military personnel from 1 July to 31 December 2006 and take into account a 5 per cent delayed deployment factor for the period from 1 January to 30 June 2007.

2. International personnel

18. The estimated requirements of $22.9 million under international staff would provide for a total of 406 international posts, comprising 119 previously approved posts and 287 additional posts (see A/61/766, para. 61). The estimate reflects a 20 per cent delayed recruitment factor for 119 posts previously authorized for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 and a 40 per cent delayed recruitment factor for 287 additional staff proposed for the period from 1 January to 30 June 2007.

3. National staff

19. The estimated cost of $18.2 million under national staff reflects requirements in respect of the proposed staffing of 696 national posts, comprising 339 previously approved posts and 357 additional posts. The resource requirements take into account the actual deployment of national staff for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2006 and their phased deployment for the period from 1 January to

30 June 2007. The estimate reflects a 10 per cent delayed recruitment factor for the 2 previously authorized National Officers, a 20 per cent delayed recruitment factor for the 337 national General Service posts previously approved for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 and a 40 per cent delayed recruitment factor in respect of 357 additional posts for the period from 1 January to 30 June 2007. The Advisory Committee recalls its view with regard to the grade level of national staff used in the computation of cost estimates (see A/61/616, para. 19), and notes that the proposed estimates are based on G-5/step V for national General Service posts and National Officer (Beirut)/step V for National Officers for the previously approved posts and G-4/step I for additional national General Service posts and National Officer (Beirut)/step I for additional National Officers.

4. General temporary assistance

20. As indicated in paragraph 67 of the budget submission, the estimated requirements of $3,972,800 under general temporary assistance reflect the cost of a total of 195 temporary positions, comprising 4 positions in the Strategic Military Cell at Headquarters, 7 positions for the Conduct and Discipline Team, 11 positions for the Regional Oversight Office and 173 positions for interpreters to support military contingents. The estimated requirements also include actual charges related to the deployment of up to 12 surge positions in the field for the period from 1 October to 31 December 2006. The Advisory Committee notes that except for the 4 positions in the Strategic Military Cell, a delayed recruitment factor of 40 per cent has been applied to the computation of costs for the 191 temporary positions.

5. Operating costs

21. A provision of $86.5 million is made under facilities and infrastructure for the expansion, relocation, construction, renovation and maintenance of the current UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura, the construction of the Force's new headquarters in Tyre, 4 battalion headquarters and 20 new campsites, as well as the construction of water wells for 10 locations. Included in the total is the rental of office space in New York for the Strategic Military Cell (4 temporary civilian positions and 29 military staff officers).

22. The Advisory Committee recalls that in connection with the estimated requirements under facilities and infrastructure, it cautioned against both extensive and long-term construction projects in the area of operation of the Force and entering into commitments to rent office space that may not be required in future on the scale then foreseen (see A/61/616, para. 21). The Committee recommended that all suitable options be studied in cooperation with the Lebanese authorities. As indicated in the budget document, UNIFIL is engaged in discussions with the Lebanese authorities on those issues. **The Committee trusts that results of the discussions will be reflected in the budget for 2007/08.**

23. The estimated requirements of $16.8 million under ground transportation reflect the increase in the vehicle fleet from 699 to 822 vehicles, the replacement of old and/or damaged vehicles, the acquisition of additional vehicles and freight costs for the transfer of vehicles from other missions. The cost estimate also includes requirements for repairs and maintenance, liability insurance and petrol and diesel fuel, including a maximum of $750,000 for fuel requirements of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

24. As indicated in the budget document, the estimated cost of $53.1 million under naval transportation reflects requirements for naval operations to provide assistance to the Government of Lebanon in securing its coastal border. The Maritime Task Force of UNIFIL would comprise a naval fleet of 4 frigates, 10 patrol boats, 1 support ship and 1 fast-patrol boat/support ship provided by troop-contributing countries under letter-of-assist arrangements. The provision includes requirements for the operation of seven helicopters attached to the vessels of the Maritime Task Force. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that under the provisions of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), the Government of Lebanon had requested UNIFIL assistance in monitoring and patrolling Lebanese territorial waters. As the Maritime Task Force was established on that basis, no supplement to the existing status-of-forces agreement was necessary.

25. The Advisory Committee was also provided upon request with the monthly rate for each naval vessel and the hourly rate for helicopters that are attached to the vessels of the Maritime Task Force. The monthly rates are as follows: frigate, $697,500; fleet supply ship, $381,300; fast-patrol boat/support ship, $291,400; fast-patrol boat, $220,100; corvette, $322,400. The helicopter rate is $1,500 per flight-hour for a maximum of 40 hours per month.

26. A provision of $211,400 is made for quick-impact projects, which are intended to address urgent needs for the rehabilitation of essential public infrastructure and services in southern Lebanon, including: (a) restoration and/or enhancement of power and water services; (b) repair of school buildings and provision of basic school furniture and/or materials; (c) repair and restoration of community shelters in villages; and (d) repair of hospitals and/or medical facilities and provision of basic medical equipment and supplies.

27. With regard to the request by the General Assembly that the Secretary-General further elaborate the rationale for and status of the exceptional measures for flexibility in the application of administrative processes, the Advisory Committee was provided, upon enquiry, with additional information on the matter, which is contained in annex II.

V. Conclusions

28. The actions to be taken by the General Assembly in connection with the financing of UNIFIL for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 are indicated in paragraph 87 of the budget document. **In view of its foregoing comments and observations, the Advisory Committee recommends that the estimated budget requirements be reduced from $522,753,200 to $496,615,500.**

Documentation

- Proposed budget for UNIFIL for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 (A/60/642 and Corr.1)
- Revised budget for UNIFIL for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 (A/61/766)
- Report of the Secretary-General on the financing of UNIFIL for the period from 1 July 2006 to 31 March 2007 (A/61/588)
- Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on the financing of UNIFIL for the period from 1 July 2006 to 31 March 2007 (A/61/616)
- General Assembly resolutions 60/278 and 61/250 on the financing of UNIFIL
- Security Council resolutions 1614 (2005), 1655 (2006) and 1701 (2006)

Annex I

Deployment of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon personnel, 2006/07

(As at 5 March 2007)

Category	Authorized/proposed	2006						2007						
		July	August	September	October	November	December	January	30 to 5 March	March	April	May	June	Average
Military personnel														
Military observers	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Staff officers	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Military contingents	15 000	1 989	2 219	5 435	9 247	10 887	10 955	12 128	13 200	13 210	13 210	13 210	14 790	10 040
Vacancy rate (percentage)		87	85	64	38	27	27	19	12	12	12	12	1	33
Total military personnel	**15 000**	**1 989**	**2 219**	**5 435**	**9 247**	**10 887**	**10 955**	**12 128**	**13 200**	**13 210**	**13 210**	**13 210**	**14 790**	**10 040**
Civilian personnel														
International staff														
Professional and above														
Under-Secretary-General	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Assistant Secretary-General	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
D-2	3							1	3	3	3	3	3	1
D-1	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	3	3	3	4	4	3
P-5	21	2	1	1	1	1	3	4	14	16	16	18	21	8
P-4	40	8	9	9	9	7	10	13	15	16	16	25	40	15
P-3	48	8	7	8	8	8	11	17	19	20	25	32	48	18
P-2/P-1	12	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	4	5	7	10	12	4
Subtotal	**129**	**22**	**21**	**22**	**22**	**20**	**28**	**40**	**59**	**64**	**71**	**93**	**129**	**49**
General Service and related														
Field Service	254	61	61	61	61	63	71	103	124	140	150	180	254	111
Principal level	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Other level	23	19	19	17	17	16	16	23	21	21	23	23	23	20
Security Service	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Subtotal	**277**	**80**	**80**	**78**	**78**	**79**	**87**	**126**	**145**	**161**	**173**	**203**	**277**	**131**

Category	Authorized proposed	2000						2001[a]						
		July	August	September	October	November	December	January	as at 5 March	March	April	May	June	Average
Total international staff	**406**	**102**	**101**	**100**	**100**	**99**	**115**	**166**	**204**	**225**	**244**	**296**	**406**	**180**
Vacancy rate (percentage)		75	75	75	75	76	72	59	50	45	40	27	—	56
National staff														
National Professional	23	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	6	10	23	5
Local General Service	673	303	299	299	301	305	304	307	306	400	425	450	673	364
Total national staff	**696**	**305**	**301**	**301**	**303**	**307**	**306**	**309**	**308**	**402**	**431**	**460**	**696**	**369**
Vacancy rate (percentage)		56	57	57	56	56	56	56	56	42	38	34	—	47
General temporary assistance[b]														
D-2	1	—	—	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
D-1	1	—	—	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
P-5	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	2
P-4	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	5
P-3	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	3
P-2/P-1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
Field Service	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
General Service (Other level)	4	—	—	—	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	4	2
National Professional	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Local General Service	176	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	100	150	173	176	149
Total general temporary assistance	**195**	—	—	**2**	**4**	**4**	**4**	**4**	**4**	**104**	**154**	**177**	**195**	**54**
Vacancy rate (percentage)		100	100	99	98	98	98	98	98	47	21	9	—	72
Total civilian personnel														
Actual	**1 297**	**407**	**402**	**403**	**407**	**410**	**425**	**479**	**516**	**731**	**829**	**933**	**1 297**	**603**
Vacancy rate (percentage)		69	69	69	69	68	67	63	60	44	36	28	—	54

[a] Includes Strategic Military Cell, Resident Oversight Office, Conduct and Discipline Team and interpreters.

Annex II

Flexibility in the application of administrative processes, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

Administrative process	*Application*
Waiver of the two-month notification process to all Member States for gratis personnel, as an exception to administrative instruction ST/AI/1999/6, to allow existing and potential UNIFIL troop-contributing countries to assist with the urgent need for military planners	Gratis personnel have not been utilized
Immediate reassignment of staff without advertisement of posts and with, as appropriate, existing delegation of authority, pending completion of the designation process under ST/SGB/2005/7	Forty-eight staff members were reassigned and offered appointments with UNIFIL from various peacekeeping missions. While those staff members were not selected against posts advertised specifically for UNIFIL, they were competitively selected from candidates from the generic vacancy announcements in the relevant occupational functions There is presently only one case in which the existing delegation of authority will be utilized pending completion of the designation process under ST/SGB/2005/7. This will be for the reassignment of the Chief, Integrated Support Services, who is coming from the same appointment in UNMIL
Relief from the present three-month limit on the temporary deployment of civilian staff	Seventeen staff members remained over the three-month limit, mainly in logistics areas (engineering, supply, communications and information technology and assets management)
Immediate increase in the "not-to-exceed" level of existing main commodities contracts (i.e., for fuel, rations, water and accommodation)	Utilized for rations until the new headquarters contract started on 1 November 2006, taking into consideration the increase in the not-to-exceed level
Increase in the procurement delegations of the mission to facilitate immediate sustainment and development of the Force	This provision has not been utilized. However, the mission placed contracts for inland transportation on a partial ex-post facto basis to ensure that the troops could be deployed without undue delay. This case is currently pending review by the Headquarters Committee on Contracts

Administrative procedure	Action taken
Deployment of troops in advance of a signed memorandum of understanding based on a broad agreement reached by the parties on the composition of the Force and the conditions under which it would be sustained in the mission area.	With the exception of troop-contributing countries existing prior to the conflict, all new troop-contributing countries have deployed troops in advance of signed memorandums of understanding. As at 28 February 2007, 6 memorandums of understanding had been signed, 4 were with permanent missions for signature, 7 were with permanent missions for review/clearance, 24 were in an advanced state of negotiations (including maritime units) and 3 were awaiting negotiation.
Use of general temporary assistance to establish additional planning capacity at Headquarters and in the field.	The approval of an additional 100 posts from general temporary assistance funds enabled the mission to expedite the recruitment of staff (up to 28 by 31 December 2006), which were placed against posts as at 1 January 2007 together with the candidates selected for the additional 72 positions. At Headquarters, 35 additional staff were recruited to provide additional capacity in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to support the expansion of UNIFIL.
Entry into letters of assist with troop-contributing countries without competitive bidding and Headquarters Committee on Contracts approval, where the support required is immediate and the cost is assessed to be reasonable.	Draft copies of the letters of assist for the Maritime Task Force have been sent to the respective permanent missions for comment. Only two maritime contributors have responded, namely, Bulgaria and the Netherlands. Currently, 11 letters of assist are under negotiation.
Entry into letters of assist with non-UNIFIL troop-contributing countries for support to the national armed forces.	This provision has not been utilized.

United Nations A/61/858

General Assembly

Distr.: General
16 March 2007

Original: English

Sixty-first session
Agenda items 116, 117, 123 and 132

Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations

Programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007

Human resources management

Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations

Investing in the United Nations: for a stronger Organization worldwide: interim report

Investing in information and communications technology

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered an advance copy of the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Investing in the United Nations: for a stronger Organization worldwide: interim report — Investing in information and communications technology" (A/61/765). During its consideration of the report, the Committee met with representatives of the Secretary-General.

2. The interim report of the Secretary-General proposes to shift the placement of the Chief Information Technology Officer from the Executive Office of the Secretary-General to a new Office of Information and Communications Technology to be established in the Department of Management. It also outlines the envisaged functions and reporting lines of the Office and describes the distribution of functions that would be delegated to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and other offices.

3. The Advisory Committee notes that, although the interim report was prepared with reference to section II of General Assembly resolution 60/283, it does not respond to requests contained therein. Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that a comprehensive report was under preparation. The Committee trusts that the

07-27308 (E) 200307

comprehensive report will respond to the requests of the Assembly in its resolution 60/283.

4. **The Advisory Committee does not find that there is sufficient justification in the interim report for the Secretary-General's proposal to reverse the decision of the General Assembly.**

5. **The Advisory Committee recommends that decisions on structures, staffing requirements, roles and responsibilities be taken up in the context of the General Assembly's consideration of the comprehensive report requested in resolution 60/283. Furthermore, as the Committee understands that the appointment of the Chief Information Technology Officer is to be made in the near future, it considers it important that the appointee be given the opportunity to contribute to the formulation of the organizational structure of the Office for which he or she will be responsible, bearing in mind that the development of information and communications technology in the United Nations also affects the wider United Nations system.**